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Abstract 
The multiple extension problem frequently arises in both diagnostic and de­
fault reasoning. That is, in many settings it is possible to use any of a number 
of sets of instances defaults or hypotheses to explain (expected) observations. 
In some cases, we choose among explanations by making inferences about infor­
mation believed to be implicit in the problem statement. H this isn't possible, 
we may still prefer one explanation to another because it is more likely or 
optimizes some other measureable property: cost, severity, fairness. 
We combine probabilities and defaults in a simple unified framework that 
retains the logical semantics of defaults and diagnosis as construction of ex­
planations from a fixed set of possible hypotheses. We view probability as a 
property of an explanation that can be computed from a what is known and 
what is hypothesized by a valuation function. We present a procedure that per­
forms an iterative deepening branch-and-bound search for explanations with the 
property that the first path found is the most likely. The procedure does not 
consider unlikely paths until more likely ones have been eliminated. 
We outline a way in which probabilities are not constrained by a priori 
independence assumptions; rather, these statistical assumptions are set up as 
defaults. 
While we use probability as a way of preferring one answer to another, the 
results apply to any property of an explanation having a valuation function 
meeting some usefulness criteria. 
Introduction 
In many situations, we want to use generalized knowledge, prototypical knowledge 
or knowledge not always true in our domain. 
Examples include: 
• default reasoning, where we use an instance of a default in order to predict 
some proposition, if we can do so consistently [27,22] . 
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• diagnosis, where we hypothesize problems with a system that explain observed 
malfunctions and are consistent with what we know about the system [26,28,6] . 
• natural language understanding, where given some discourse we want to com­
pute the underlying presuppositions to allow for the most meaningful reply 
[17,20] . 
• planning, where we hypothesize a sequence of actions that imply completion 
of a goal[12] . 
• user modelling, where we hypothesize about the knowledge and beliefs of a 
user[30] . 
Here, we consider a use of logic different from just finding what deductively 
follows from our knowledge. We use the idea of constructing explanations from a 
fixed set of possible hypotheses supplied by the user. We try to build an explanation 
of our goal from instances of these possible hypotheses that is consistent with all our 
knowledge. If the possible hypotheses are defaults and the goal is something we are 
trying to predict, then this characterizes a natural form of default reasoning [24] . If 
the possible hypotheses are possible diseases or malfunctions of some system and the 
goal is the observed behaviour of the system then we have model-based diagnosis [11] . 
In [19] this kind of diagnostic reasoning is called abduction or parsimonious .covering 
theory with the restriction that there is inferential distance one between observations 
and hypotheses. Similarly, recognition can be seen as constructing explanations for 
incomplete impressions where the possible hypotheses are the prototypes of the 
things we are trying to recognize. 
In essence we are proposing something like scientific theory formation, but with­
out the problem of generating the hypotheses. We assume that the user provides 
the forms of the hypotheses she is prepared to accept as part of an explanation. 
Unless observations together with facts contain complete information about the 
system, it is natural that a single set of observations may have many explanations: 
hence, we get the "multiple extension" problem [8,14] . To choose among explana­
tions, or extensions, we must define appropriate comparators. Existing comparators 
seem to fall into two broad classes. The first class uses information believed to be 
implicit in the problem statement to choose among explanations for the one that is 
correct in the intended interpretation. For example: 
• Poole [23] proposes t.he notion of most specific theory t.o give semant.ics t.o t.he 
idea that when we have generalized knowledge and more specific knowledge 
represented as defaults, then we prefer to use the more specific knowledge 
when both are applicable[29] . To illustrate, suppose we believe the general­
izations that mammals don't fly, bats fly, but dead bats do not. These can 
be represented as possible hypotheses. If Dracula is a dead bat, we want to 
predict that he doesn't fly with the explanation that dead bats don't fly rather 
than the explanation that mammals don't fly or predict that he flies because 
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bats typically do fly; we prefer the explanation that uses the most specific 
information. 
• Applied to the Yale shooting scenario[14,12], constructing explanations pro­
duces undesirable yet consistent theories that rankle intuition. (Other for­
malisms fare no better.) Goodwin[12] and Kautz[15] use persistence to choose 
the explanation that they believe is correct in the intended interpretation. 
These approaches try to provide general ways to complete databases of predicates 
by making assumptions about the knowledge. 
The second class of comparators views all consistent explanations as possibil­
ities and so compares them on the basis of some measurable property. We call 
comparators of this sort heuristic since they require other kinds of knowledge about 
the domain. In our current research, we characterize this extra knowledge with 
a valuation function which assigns "goodness" values to competing explanations. 
Presently we are most interested in using likelihood to compare explanations given 
some observations, but in other situations, we might use cost or virulence. 
This seems like an appropriate way to use probability in the commonsense do­
main. It has philosophical counterparts [3,16] and is similar in spirit to the imple­
mentations of [6] and [19]. 
A current investigation of this second class of comparators has yielded promising 
initial results. We give semantics for explainability and add semantics f<>r compara­
tors that are useful in setting where observations are known to be true, for example, 
diagnosis. We discuss properties a valuator must have so that a comparator is use­
ful. In particular, probability is a useful comparator. We then describe a procedure 
that generates theories according to the order defined by the comparator. Lastly, 
we touch on a way to give semantics to valuators, (in particular, probability) with 
the aim of achieving efficiency but not at the cost of losing precision of meaning. 
2 Semantics 
2.1 Constructing explanations 
Here we give the formal semantics of explainability. 
The user provides the system with two sets of formulae: 
F is a set of closed formulae called facts. 
� is a set of formulae called possible hypotheses. These can be defaults, prototypes, 
possible malfunctions or anything else we are prepared to accept as part of an 
explanation of some goal. 
A goal g is explainable if there is some D, a set of ground instances of members 
of�' such that 
FuDt=g 
F U D is consistent. 
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and D is called an explanation of g. We sometimes say that D predicts g or that D 
is the theory that explains g. 
If d contains generalized knowledge ("birds fly" , for example) and g is some 
proposition we want to predict, we have default reasoning. If d contains possible 
diseases or malfunctions as well as defaults, and g is the observations of the system, 
we have diagnosis. 
Poole describes this system in the framework of the first order predicate logic, 
but notes that the system is not restricted to that logic[21]. We want an explanation 
which predicts the goal, but does not predict anything which we know is false. 
2.2 Comparing explanations 
A valuator is a function m(g, D) where D is an explanation of goal g. We assume 
the set of facts F fixed in any application. The range of m is a poset ordered by ::5. 
We prefer explanation D1 to explanation D2 if m(g, D2) ::5 m(g, D1) and we write 
D2 ::5 D1. If D1 ::5 D2 and D2 ::5 D1 then D1 � D2. If D1 ::5 D2 and not D1 � D2 
then D1 --< D2. 
A valuator m is useful if: 
1. m is defined at least for every D and g such that D is an explanation for g. 
This ensures that m is defined whenever we have two explanations to compare, 
but doesn't insist that m be defined when D is irrelevant to g. This to some 
extent accommodates the proponents of intuitive probability who do not insist 
that hie be defined for all h and e. 
2. if FUD2 * D1, then m(g, D2) ::5 m(g, D1). This corresponds to preferring ex­
planations which make fewer assumptions, in the sense of logical implication or 
the subset relation (the above implication holds, in particular when D1 � D2). 
Following William of Occam, we always prefer a simpler explanation. Adding 
hypotheses decreases certainty or increases cost, both undesirable features. 
These assumptions are consistent with Aleliunas' extension[!] of the Cox's result 
[5]. Then it is easy to see that standard real-valued probability is a useful valuation 
function and m could be interpreted as the conditional probability of D given g. 
We retain the more general notion of valuation of explanations - it seems consistent 
with every heuristic comparator we can think of. 
Below, we assume that m is a useful valuator. If D�e is such that there is no 
j such that m(D�e,g) -< m(Dj,g), then Dk is a preferred explanation with respect 
to m and g and F. We usually simply call D�e a preferred explanation when the 
context is clear. 
3 Implementation 
Some diagnostic programs [7] compute the probability of all possible elements of 
d given the observations and let the user select the best. This is only possible 
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in specialized domains. We can also find a preferred explanation by generating 
all explanations (using the machinery described below), then valuating and sorting 
them. We propose the following as an intelligent model of reasoning: to explain 
some observations, an agent will follow a particular line of thought until it becomes 
weakened by too many strong assumptions; then she will switch to a more plausible 
line of thought. Such an agent finds a best explanation without having to completely 
explore obscure possibilities in detail. 
Poole, Goebel and Aleliuna.s describe an implementation of explainability in [25] 
and include a terse Prolog implementation. Briefly, the theorem prover tries to prove 
some observations g from F and Ll, and makes D the set of instances of members of 
Ll used in the proof, as long as it fails to prove that F U  D is inconsistent. When the 
theorem prover uses a ground instance 8 of Ll, we say it makes the assumption 8 or 
assumes the hypothesis 8. The theorem prover may also obtain new observations if 
there are predicates proved by querying the user. 
We use the same technique, but build all proofs incrementally using a separate 
process for each proof. If D only explains some of the observations in g, we compute 
m by considering only the observations in g explained by D. 
Each partial proof of the observations, carries a state parameter < 0, D, N > 
describing currently known global observations 0, a local partial explanation D and 
the value N = m(O, D). If we are ranking explanations by likelihood, N is an 
optimistic upper bound on the final value of m when the proof halts, i.e., if the 
unexplained observations follow from the facts and the current assumptions. The 
procedure begins with the initial observations, the null hypothesis and an appropri­
ate initial value for the null hypothesis. In the case of real-valued probabilities, this 
is 1.0. N decreases in any process that assumes a new hypothesis; it may change in 
any way in any proof whenever new observations are made. 
The procedure follows: 
1. Create a process with initial state < g, {}, n > where g represents the ini­
tial observations, the empty set represents the null explanation, and n is an 
appropriate initial value. 
2. If a process assumes h, create a child process that is a copy of the parent. 
If F U D � •h, set the state of the parent process from < 0, D, N > to 
< 0, {h} U D, m(O, {h} U D)> and suspend it; else kill the process. Make the 
child backtrack to the last choice point (i.e., "un-assume" h). 
3. If a new observation o is made (if the user provides more information about 
the domain), reset the states of all processes from < 0, D, N > to < { o} U 
O, D, m({o} U O, D  >. Suspend all processes. 
4. If all processes are suspended, kill all processes with inconsistent 0 U D and 
restart a process with a highest value of N. If no running or suspended pro­
cesses remain, there is no solution, halt. Otherwise, continue running the 
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current process until either a new fact is learned or a new hypothesis is as­
sumed, then go to step 2. If the current process completes a proof, print the 
answer and halt. 
This is completely undecidable, since the procedure defines a control structure 
for a theorem prover that does consistency checks. However, if it halts, it has either 
found a preferred explanation or there is no explanation. 
As long as no new observations are made, step 2 ensures that we are always 
working on the most promising explanation. Step 3 ensures all proofs exploit any 
new knowledge. 
We have a prototype Prolog program which compiles specifications of F and 
d and m to a Prolog program that searches for a preferred explanation. With an 
empty d and a null valuator, the compiled code behaves exactly like Prolog. 
4 Measuring properties of explanations 
We have given semantics for explainability and preferability given a valuation func­
tion, but we have not given semantics for the valuation function itself. We are 
investigating giving ways of semantics to valuators based on the explainability for­
malism and give the basic ideas below with specific reference to probabilities. 
The practical activity of calculating likelihood always seems to involve making 
statistical assumptions in the absence of other information. Otherwise the required 
calculations are intractable. For example: 
• In the electronic circuit diagnosis problem, gates fail independently [6]. 
• Conditional independence of symptoms given diseases [2,19]. 
• The maximum entropy assumption. [4] 
• When performing diagnosis, given no information to the contrary, we assume 
an individual might have contracted some disease with likelihood equal to the 
statistical mean unless we have information that the individual is particularly 
susceptible or particularly resilient to that disease. 
In [13], Benjamin Grosof makes similar observations and places calculation of 
probabilities in the setting of Reiter's defaults and pointwise circumscription. He 
also discusses another independence assumption, maximization of conditional inde­
pendence. 
But it may not be natural to make any single statistical assumption an axiom 
of a theory of probability. A frequent problem with the old medical diagnostic 
systems, for example, is that a host of statistical assumptions were forced on the 
data a priori, resulting in the loss of useful exceptional information [10,18]. No 
statistical assumption is foolproof in general and there may be situations where we 
want to make other kinds of assumptions. 
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The explainability formalism potentially gives us a simple solution to all these 
problems. We divide a theory of probability into facts F, and domain dependent 
statistical assumptions a,. The facts contain user-supplied statistics as well as the 
standard axioms of probability theory. aP may contain independence and other 
kinds of assumptions. The user or the theorem prover may decide what statistical 
assumptions are appropriate in a given setting. In any case, the assumptions are 
used only when no other information is known or can be derived. This also gives 
an interesting symmetry: probability as a useful valuator of explanations, can be 
used to guide the explainability machinery to produce a preferred explanation first 
and the machinery for explainability can be used to obtain the most meaningful 
probability in given situation. 
Many uncertainty formalisms trade tractability for precision of meaning. We 
believe that it is the special case where the expensive computation occurs in our 
system, and in general we can have the best of both worlds. In any case, this idea 
seems to accommodate any valuation functions meeting our usefulness criteria and 
allows arbitrary exceptional information. Practical ways to flexibly incorporate such 
statistical assumptions are currently under investigation. 
5 Conclusions 
We have borrowed from the ideas of Reiter[28], deKleer[6], Reggia[26], Geneser­
eth[11,9], and Grosof[13] to construct a framework for constructing explanations 
independent of the logic used (though we favour first order predicate logic) and 
independent of the heuristic used to guide the theorem proving procedure to the 
preferred explanation (though we favour probability and its derivatives). 
We suggested that the probabilities could be calculated in a smaller version of 
the framework where statistical assumptions were modelled as possible hypotheses, 
providing an interesting duality to the system. 
Our implementation handles diagnosis of simple circuits (the full adder example 
from Genesereth[ll]) , and small medical diagnostic problems. The initial results 
seem to suggest that probability and logic work together well as two simple dif­
ferent interacting cooperative processes; however, many interesting theoretical and 
practical problems remain to be solved. 
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